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Abstract—In this paper, inner and outer bounds on the capac-
ity region of two-user interference channels with two confidential
messages have been proposed. By adding secure multiplex coding
to the error correction method in [15] which achieves the best
achievable capacity region for interference channel up to now, we
have shown that the improved secure capacity region compared
with [2] now is the whole Han-Kobayashi region. In addition,
this construction not only removes the rate loss incurred by
adding dummy messages to achieve security, but also change
the original weak security condition in [2] to strong security.
Then the equivocation rate for a collection of secret messages
has also been evaluated, when the length of the message is
finite or the information rate is high, our result provides a good
approximation for bounding the worst case equivocation rate.
Our results can be readily extended to the Gaussian interference
channel with little efforts.
Index Terms—Information theoretic security, capacity region,
interference channel, secure multiplex coding, strong security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic security [1] attracts a lot of attention
as security is one of the most important issues in communica-
tion, and it guarantees security even when the adversary has
unlimited computing power.
Interference channel [14] has been one of the most im-
portant channel models investigated in information theory as
it captures the main features of the multi-input multi-output
communication system. Signals from different transmitters in
this model exert influence on each other, which also adds the
necessity and difficulty for secure communication.
In the paper [16] that proposed the Han-Kobayashi region
which provided the best inner bound known to now, the
information from each transmitter was divided into two parts,
the first part was for only one receiver (we say this part of the
information is sent over the “private channel”), and the other
part could be decoded by both receivers (we say this part
of the information is sent over the “common channel”). This
naturally raises one question: what is the secrecy transmission
rate if only confidential messages are sent? In [2], the authors
proposed a scheme which is just a modification of the coding
scheme in [15], but they only sent information on the “private
channel”. This is a natural solution, but in this paper, we
show somewhat surprisingly that even if we transmit over
the “common channel”, confidentiality can also be guaranteed,
thus we propose a larger achievable security rate region.
Also in [2], outer and inner bounds have been provided,
but are under the weak secrecy requirement [3], which re-
quires that the mutual information divided by the length of
the codeword goes to zero as the codeword length goes to
infinity. But this requirement is not strong enough for some
applications [10] [11], because even if this rate goes to zero
asymptotically, vital information bits can still be easily leaked
to an illegitimate receiver. Moreover, secrecy is achieved by
adding dummy random bits into the transmitted signal, which
inevitably decreases the information rate.
The authors in [2] did not evaluate the equivocation rate
when the information rates of the secret messages are large
or the length of the message is finite. This means that their
results are only valid for the cases where secrecy can be
asymptotically achieved, but if the secrecy requirement is not
achieved, they are not able to evaluate how much information
may be leaked out.
In [12], the authors calculated the secure degree of freedom
achievable with strong security requirement in interference
channels. But the degree of freedom is only a crude measure
for information transmission speed, and the knowledge on the
capacity region of the interference channel with strong security
requirement remains to be limited.
In [4], the authors proposed the secure multiplex coding
scheme for wiretap channels, the goal of which is to remove
the rate loss incurred by the random dummy message. The
main idea is to transmit T statistically independent secret
messages simultaneously, and for each secret message, other
messages serve as “random bits”, making it ambiguous for
eavesdroppers. In [7] and [9], the authors applied the secure
multiplex coding in different scenarios: broadcast channels
with a common message and secure network coding. They
showed that secure multiplex coding can not only remove
the information rate loss, but can also achieve strong security
within the capacity region. Despite all these findings, it is still
not clear whether such technique can also be generalized to
other multiuser communication scenarios.
In this paper, the model of interference channel with con-
fidential messages as in [2] is considered, by applying the
technique of secure multiplex coding, we have proposed inner
and outer bounds on the capacity region within which the
strong security requirement can be achieved. Moreover, we
give the dominating term approximation for a lower bound
Fig. 1. Interference channel with confidential messages.
on the equivocation rate with finite message length. We also
show that all the above results can be easily carried over to
the Gaussian interference channel case.
This paper is organized as the following: in Section II, the
system model and the necessary mathematical tools used shall
be introduced. In Section III, the random coding scheme is
presented, based on which we propose an inner bound on the
capacity region of the interference channel. An outer bound
is also proposed. In Section IV we extend our results to the
Gaussian interference channel. We provide some discussion
and comparison of our results with that in [2] in Section V.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
We adopt the same channel model as in [2]. Consider
a discrete memoryless interference channel with finite input
alphabets X1, X2, finite output alphabets Y1, Y2, and the
channel transition probability distribution PY1,Y2|X1,X2 . Two
transmitters wish to send independent, confidential messages
to their respective receivers. The channel model is illustrated
in Figure 1.
The main goals of communication under this framework
are:
1) To ensure the decoding error probability for each re-
ceiver to be small enough;
2) Secrecy requirement, which means the receiver intend-
ing to receive one message should be kept in ignorance
for the other message.
By secure multiplex coding, we mean that multiple statis-
tically independent messages are sent over virtually different
channels (actually all these messages are sent simultaneously
through the same physical channel), and any such channel
or collection of channels is required to be secure to the
unintended receiver.
To make the above arguments accurate, the definition of
the capacity region for the interference channel with secure
multiplex coding is given as follow:
Definition 1: The rate tuple (R1,1, . . . , R1,T1 ,
R2,1, . . . , R2,T2) and the equivocation rate tuple
{(R1,I1,e, R2,I2,e) | ∅ 6= I1 ⊆ {1, . . . , T1}, ∅ 6= I2 ⊆
{1, . . . , T2}} are said to be achievable for the secure
multiplex coding with T1 secret messages for sender 1
and T2 messages for sender 2, if there exists a sequence
of stochastic encoders for sender 1 denoted as ζn1 :
Cn1,1 × · · · × C
n
1,T1
→ Xn1 , and for sender 2 denoted as ζn2
: Cn2,1 × · · · × C
n
2,T2
→ Xn2 , and for receiver 1 deterministic
decoder ϕn1 : Yn1 → Cn1,1 × · · · × Cn1,T1 , and for receiver 2
deterministic decoder ϕn2 : Yn2 → Cn2,1 × · · · × Cn2,T2 such that
lim
n→∞
Pr[(Cn1,1, . . . , C
n
1,T1) 6= ϕ
n
1 (Y
n
1 )
or (Cn2,1, . . . , C
n
2,T2) 6= ϕ
n
2 (Y
n
2 )] = 0, (1)
lim
n→∞
I(Cn1,I1 ;Y
n
2 ) = 0
(
if R1,I1,e =
∑
i∈I1
R1,i
)
, (2)
lim
n→∞
I(Cn2,I2 ;Y
n
1 ) = 0
(
if R2,I2,e =
∑
i∈I2
R2,i
)
, (3)
lim inf
n→∞
H(Cn1,I1 |Y
n
2 )/n ≥ R1,I1,e, (4)
lim inf
n→∞
H(Cn2,I2 |Y
n
1 )/n ≥ R2,I2,e, (5)
lim inf
n→∞
log |Cn1,i|
n
≥ R1,i, (6)
lim inf
n→∞
log |Cn2,j|
n
≥ R2,j , (7)
for i = 1, . . . , T1 and j = 1, . . . , T2 , where Cn1,i and
Cn2,j represent the i-th secret message from sender 1 and
the j-th secret message from sender 2 respectively. All of
Cn1,i and Cn2,j have uniform distribution on Cn1,i and Cn2,j and
are statistically independent. Both of Cn1,I1, and C
n
2,I2,
are
collections of random variables: Cn1,I1 = {C
n
1,i | i ∈ I1} and
Cn2,I2 = {C
n
2,j | j ∈ I2}. The received signals by the two
receivers are denoted as Y n1 and Y n2 , with the transmitted sig-
nals ζn1 (Cn1,1, . . . , Cn1,T1), ζ
n
2 (C
n
2,1, . . . , C
n
2,T2
), and the channel
transition probability PY1,Y2|X1,X2 . The capacity region of the
secure multiplex coding is the closure of the achievable rate
tuples.
Remark 2: In the above definition we require the mutual
information I(Cn1,I1 ;Y
n
2 ) and I(Cn2,I2 ;Y
n
1 ) approaches zero
as n approaches infinity when R1,I1,e =
∑
i∈I1
R1,i and
R1,I1,e =
∑
i∈I1
R1,i, this is the requirement of the strong
secrecy according to [3].
The main idea behind the multiplex coding is that more
“constraints” have been put on the confidential message to
remove the rate loss caused by adding dummy message:
instead of sending one confidential message, multiple in-
dependent messages are transmitted, so instead of making
the mutual information between (Cn1,1, · · · , Cn1,T1) and Y
n
2 to
be zero, we now only need to ensure I(Cn1,i, Y n2 ) vanishes,
which means each multiplex channel is secure. For other
messages (Cn1,1, · · · , Cn1,i−1, Cn1,i+1, · · · , Cn1,T1), since they are
independent with Cn1,i, so they acted as noise and provide
protection for Cn1,i.
B. Preliminaries
In this paper the main tools we are going to use is the
strengthened privacy amplification theorem, which will be
sensitive to the change of bases. So throughout the whole paper
we just use natural log.
Definition 3: [13] Let F be a set of functions from S1 to
S2, and F the not necessarily uniform random variable on F .
If for any x1 6= x2 ∈ S1 we have
Pr[F (x1) = F (x2)] ≤
1
|S2|
,
then F is said to be a family of two-universal hash functions.
Theorem 4: [8][9] Let L be a random variable with uniform
distribution over a finite alphabet L and Z be any discrete
random variable. Let F be a family of two-universal hash
functions from L to M, and F be a random variable on F
statistically independent of L. Then
Ef exp(ρI(F (L);Z|F = f))
≤ 1+
|M|ρ
|L|ρ
∑
z,ℓ
PL(ℓ)PZ|L(z|ℓ)
1+ρPZ(z)
−ρ. (8)
for 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
Remark 5: It was assumed that Z was discrete in [9].
However, when the alphabet of L is finite, there is no difficulty
to extend the original result.
Definition 6:
ψ(ρ, PZ|L, PL) = log
∑
z
∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)PZ|L(z|ℓ)
1+ρPZ(z)
−ρ,
(9)
φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL) = log
∑
z
(∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)(PZ|L(z|ℓ)
1/(1−ρ))
)1−ρ
.
(10)
Observe that φ is essentially Gallager’s function E0 [5]. The
main reason we introduce this function is that its concavity
greatly facilitates the process of derivation.
Proposition 7: [5], [6] exp(φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)) is concave with
respect to PL with fixed 0 < ρ < 1 and PZ|L. For fixed
0 < ρ < 1, PL and PZ|L we have
exp(ψ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)) ≤ exp(φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)). (11)
It can be found in [5] that the derivative of the Gallager’s
function has a simple expression when ρ = 0:
lim
ρ→0
dφ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)
dρ
=
∑
l,z
PL,Z(l, z) log
PZ|L
PZ
= I(Z,L).
(12)
Introduction to the Han-Kobayashi region can be found in
Lemma 4 in [15], and is presented as below:
Theorem 8: Let P∗1 be the set of probability distribution
P ∗1 (·) that factor as
P ∗(u,w1, w2, v1, v2)
= p(u)p(v1, w1|u)p(v2, w2|u)
(13)
Let RHK(P ∗1 ) be the set of nonnegative rate-tuples
(R1, R2) that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|W2U) (15)
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|W1W2U) + I(V2W1;Y2|W2U) (16)
R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2|W1U) (17)
R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2|W2W1U) + I(V1W2;Y1|W1U) (18)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1W2;Y1|U) + I(V2;Y2|W1W2U) (19)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1;Y1|W1W2U) + I(V2W1;Y2|U) (20)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1W2;Y1|W1U) + I(V2W1;Y2|W2U) (21)
2R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1W2;Y1|U) + I(V1;Y1|W1W2U)+
I(V2W1;Y2|W2U) (22)
R1 + 2R2 ≤ I(V2W1;Y2|U) + I(V2;Y2|W1W2U)+
I(V1W2;Y1|W1U) (23)
R1, R2 ≥ 0 (24)
Then we have
RHK = ∪P∗
1
∈P∗
1
RHK(P
∗
1 )
is an achievable rate region for the discrete memoryless IC.
III. CAPACITY REGION OF THE SECURE MULTIPLEX
CODING WITH STRONG SECRECY REQUIREMENT
A. Inner Bound
Denote the total rate of the sender t by 0 ≤ Rt =∑Tt+1
i=1 Rt,i ≤ I(Vt;Yt|U) (here t = 1 or 2, and we adopt this
notation throughout the paper). An inner bound is proposed
as the following:
Theorem 9: Let P∗2 be the set of probability distribution
P ∗2 (·) that factor as
P (u,w1, w2, v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2)
= P (u)P (w1, w2, v1, v2, x1, x2|u)P (y1, y2|x1, x2)
= P (u)P (w1, v1|u)P (x1|v1)P (w2, v2|u)P (x2|v2)
P (y1, y2|x1, x2)
(25)
Here x1, x2 and y1, y2 are inputs and outputs for the
interference channel respectively.
And Rin(P ∗2 ) be the set of nonnegative rate-tuples and
(R1, R2, R1,I1,e, R2,I2,e) satisfy
R
′
1,I1,e = R1,I1,e + I(V1;Y2|U, V2) (26)
R
′
2,I2,e = R2,I2,e + I(V2;Y1|U, V1) (27)
(R1, R2) ∈ RHK(P
∗
2 ) (28)
(R
′
1,I1,e, R
′
2,I2,e) ∈ RHK(P
∗
2 ) (29)
0 ≤ R1,I1,e ≤
∑
i∈I1
R1,i (30)
0 ≤ R2,I2,e ≤
∑
j∈I2
R2,j (31)
(32)
Note in the above we abuse the notation a little
by writing RHK(P ∗2 ), we can write this because if
P (u,w1, w2, v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2) ∈ P ∗2 , then the marginal
distribution P (u,w1, w2, v1, v2) ∈ P ∗1 .
An inner bound for the interference channels with secure
multiplex coding is
Rin = ∪P∗
2
∈P∗
2
Rin(P
∗
2 )
Remark 10: The inner bound of secret capacity over in-
terference channel given above shows that the whole Han-
Kobayashi region can be achieved, which means that in
our proposed coding method, the channel capacity of the
interference channel has been fully utilized, and is guaranteed
to be secure.
From (44) to (46), we can see that when (26) – (31) are
satisfied, then the strong security can be achieved. Note that
(44) – (47) also provides an upper bound for the leaked
information, which is not analyzed in [2].
Proof: To prove that the above region is an inner bound
on the capacity region, we need to explicitly show that there
does exist certain scheme that can achieve the bound. In part 1
of the proof, we present the scheme, and in part 2 we evaluate
the equivocation rate.
Part 1: Random Coding Scheme
Before we present the random coding scheme, some
notations are introduced here: let (cnt,1, · · · , cnt,Tt) ∈
(Cnt,1, · · · , C
n
t,Tt
) be the secret messages for transmitter t, and
denote Cnt =
∏Tt+1
i=1 C
n
t,i, where Cnt,Tt+1 is the alphabet of
randomness used by the stochastic encoder, and n denotes the
code length. In here and all the following expressions t = 1
or 2. Let Fnt be the set of all linear bijective maps from Cnt
to itself.
We modify the random coding scheme proposed in [15],
and apply the secure multiplex coding techniques. The new
scheme is described in detail as the follows:
Fix the distribution of P (u), P (wt, vt|u) and P (xt|vt), also
since the channel distribution P (y1, y2|x1, x2) is given, all the
distributions in (25) are now fixed.
1. Codebook Generation: Sender t and receiver t
fix and agree on the choice of a bijective function
fnt ∈ F
n
t . Given Tt secret messages (cnt,1, · · · , cnt,Tt) ∈
(Cnt,1, · · · , C
n
t,Tt
), uniformly choose cnt,Tt+1 ∈ C
n
t,Tt+1
, let
ct = (f
n
t )
−1(cnt,1, · · · , c
n
t,Tt+1
). Here the message cnt,Tt+1 is
used by the stochastic encoder to increase the randomness in
the secret message.
In order to use multiplex coding, we write:
Cnt = (E
n
t , B
n
t ) = (f
n
t )
−1(Cnt,1, · · · , C
n
t,Tt+1) (33)
In (33), fnt belongs to the family of linear bijective maps
Fnt , and this is achieved by matrix multiplication. Applying
(fnt )
−1 on the secret messages can be achieved in the follow-
ing way:
Cnt = (Lt)
−1 ∗ [Cnt,1, · · · , C
n
t,Tt+1]
T
Note that if the length of Cnt,i is kt,i bits, then Lt is a
nonsingular matrix of size lt × lt with lt =
∑
1≤i≤Tt+1
kt,i.
Since Cnt has lt bits, we just need to take some part of the bits
for Bnt and part for Ent , then the condition of independence
will be satisfied. This is guaranteed by the uniformness of Lt
and Cnt .
Equation (33) actually means that we do not distinguish
which part was to be sent over the “private channel” and which
was to be sent over the “common channel”, after the random
bijective mapping, we just divide the message into two parts
and sent them. But we need to require that Ent and Bnt are
mutually independent, this can be achieved because all the
messages cnt,i have uniform distribution over its alphabet and
are all independent.
Then in the following, we will encode Ent and Bnt in two
different ways.
Randomly generate a sequence u with probability P (u) =∏n
i=1 P (ui), and assume that both transmitters and receivers
know the time-sharing sequence u.
For transmitter t, generate 2nSt independent sequences (St
is the information rate over the “common channel”) wt each
with probability P (wt|u) =
∏n
i=1 P (wt,i|ui). Then generate
2nRt (Rt = St + Tt, and Tt is the rate of information
over “private channel”) independent sequences vt each with
probability P (vt|wtu) =
∏n
i=1 P (vt,i|wt,i, ui).
2. Encoding: Encode ct with encoder t1 and t2 (here t = 1
or 2, refer to Fig. 2), according to the codebook generated
in the previous step and obtain the codeword vnt . Then the
transmitters generate the channel input sequences based on
respective mappings PX1|V1 and PX2|V2 . Actually this step
is to apply artificial noise to vnt according to the conditional
probability distribution and get the transmitted signal. This
step is to make the channel of the other receiver more noisy,
and the intended receiver t is supposed to know this PXt|Vt .
The encoder structure is illustrated by the following figure:
Fig. 2. Code construction for the interference channel with confidential
messages.
In the above figure, U is the time-sharing sequence known
by all the transmitters and receivers. The codebook for en-
coder ij is denoted as λij ∈ Λij (i, j = 1, 2), for the
simplicity of notations, let λ = (λ11, λ12, λ21, λ22), and
Λ = (Λ11,Λ12,Λ21,Λ22).
According to the structure of the encoder, we have the
following relationship among the variables:
Wnt = Λ(E
n
t , U
n), V nt = Λ(B
n
t ,W
n
t , U
n)
3. Decoding: Without loss of generality, we consider for re-
ceiver 1. Let A(n)ǫ (W1, V1,W2, Y1, U) denote the set of jointly
typical sequences defined in [17] page 521. Since receiver 1 is
supposed to know the time sharing sequence Un, after receiv-
ing Y n1 , the receiver will try to find Wˆn1 , Vˆ n1 , Wˆn2 such that
(Wˆn1 , Vˆ
n
1 , Wˆ
n
2 , Y
n
1 , U
n) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (W1, V1,W2, Y1, U). When
such choice exists and is unique then the decoding is suc-
cessful, then message En1 and Bn1 can be restored, and the
confidential message can be readily obtained by fn1 (En1 , Bn1 );
otherwise declare error.
Part 2: Evaluation of Equivocation Rate
If we compare our modified scheme with the original one
in [15], it can be easily observed that the decoding error
probability in the new scheme is at least as good as the original
one, which saves us the efforts to analyze the probability of
decoding error. Hence we only need to show the existence of
the tuple (u, λ, fn1 , fn2 ) such that the strong secrecy require-
ment (2), (3), (4) and (5) can be fulfilled. Without loss of
generality, we just need to consider the information leaked
to receiver 2 from sender 1. In [8], it has been proved that
if Fn1 is an uniform random variable on Fn1 and α1,I is
the projection from Cn1 to
∏
i∈I C
n
1,i, then α1,I ◦ Fn1 is a
family of two-universal hashing functions. The projection is
simply α1,I(Cn1 ) , {Cni,1 | i ∈ I}. With a little abuse of
notations, we also write Cn1 = (Fn1 )−1(Cn1,1, . . . , Cn1,T1+1)(but the distinction can be made between the context compared
with equation (33)), by the uniformness of the distribution it
can be seen Cn1 and Fn1 are statistically independent.
We first calculate the mutual information
I(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 |F
n
1 ,Λ, U
n) averaged over all possible
choices of (u, λ, fn1 ). Then by some probabilistic argument,
the achievability of the theorem can be proved.
The following derivation is similar to [7] and [8], we first
fix the code book λ and the synchronization sequence u, and
ρ is a real constant with 0 < ρ < 1.
Efn
1
exp
(
ρI (α1,I (F
n
1 (C
n
1 )) ;Y
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,Λ = λ, U
n = u)
)
≤ Efn
1
exp
(
ρI(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 , C
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,
Λ = λ, Un = u)
)
= Efn
1
exp
(
ρ
∑
c2
PCn
2
(c2)I(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 |
Fn1 = f
n
1 , C
n
2 = c2,Λ = λ, U
n = u)
)
≤ Efn
1
∑
b2,e2
PBn
2
(b2)PEn
2
(e2) exp
(
ρI(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 |
Fn1 = f
n
1 , B
n
2 = b2, E
n
2 = e2,Λ = λ, U
n = u)
)
≤ 1 +
exp(nρRI)
exp(nρRp)
∑
b2,e2
PBn
2
(b2)PEn
2
(e2)
∑
c1,y2
PCn
1
(c1)
PY n
2
|Cn
1
,Bn
2
,En
2
,Λ=λ,Un=u(y2|c1, b2, e2)
1+ρ
PY n
2
|Bn
2
=b2,En2 =e2,Λ=λ,U
n=u(y2)
−ρ (34)
(by Eq. (8)) (35)
where
RI =
∑
i∈I log |C
n
1,i|
n
, (36)
Rp =
log |Cn1 |
n
. (37)
We have the following relationship: Wnt = Λ(Ent , Un) and
V nt = Λ(B
n
t ,W
n
t , U
n), thus
∑
b2,e2
PBn
2
(b2)PEn
2
(e2)
∑
c1,y2
PCn
1
(c1)
PY n
2
|Cn
1
,Bn
2
,En
2
,Λ=λ,Un=u(y2|c1, b2, e2)
1+ρ
PY n
2
|Bn
2
=b2,En2 =e2,Λ=λ,U
n=u(y2)
−ρ
=
∑
y2,v1,v2,w1,w2
∑
b2:(λ,b2,w2,u)=v2
PBn
2
(b2)
∑
w2:(λ,e2,u)=w2
PEn
2
(e2)
∑
b1:(λ,b1,w1,u)=v1
PBn
1
(b1)
∑
w1:(λ,e1,u)=w1
PEn
1
(e1)
PY n
2
|Bn
1
,Bn
2
,Wn
1
,Wn
2
,Λ=λ,Un=u(y2|b1, b2, w1, w2)
1+ρ
PY n
2
|Bn
2
=b2,Wn2 =w2,Λ=λ,U
n=u(y2)
−ρ
=
∑
v1,v2,w1,w2,y2
PV n
2
|Λ=λ,Wn
2
=w2,Un=u(v2)PWn2 |Λ=λ,Un=u(w2)
PV n
1
|Λ=λ,Wn
1
=w1,Un=u(v1)PWn1 |Λ=λ,Un=u(w1)
PY n
2
|V n
1
,V n
2
,Λ=λ,Un=u(y2|v1, v2)
1+ρ
PY n
2
|V n
2
=v2,Λ=λ,Un=u(y2)
−ρ
=
∑
v1,v2,y2
PV n
2
|Λ=λ,Un=u(v2)PV n
1
|Λ=λ,Un=u(v1)
PY n
2
|V n
1
,V n
2
,Λ=λ,Un=u(y2|v1, v2)
1+ρ
PY n
2
|V n
2
=v2,Λ=λ,Un=u(y2)
−ρ (38)
Take (38) into (35) and continue the derivation, we have
Efn
1
exp
(
ρI(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,Λ = λ, U
n = u)
)
≤ 1 +
∑
v2
PV n
2
|Λ=λ,Un=u(v2) exp
(
nρ(RI −Rp)+
ψ(ρ, PY n
2
|V n
1
,V n
2
=v2,Λ=λ,Un=u, PV n1 |V n2 =v2,Λ=λ,Un=u)
)
(by [7] and Eq. (9)),
≤ 1 +
∑
v2
PV n
2
|Λ=λ,Un=u(v2) exp
(
nρ(RI −Rp)+
φ(ρ, PY n
2
|V n
1
,V n
2
=v2,Λ=λ,Un=u, PV n1 |V n2 =v2,Λ=λ,Un=u)
)
(by Eq. (11))
Then we average the above upper bound over Λ and Un:
exp
(
ρI(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 |F
n
1 ,Λ, U
n)
)
= exp
(
Efn
1
,λ,uρI(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,
Λ = λ, Un = u)
)
≤ Efn
1
,λ,u exp
(
ρI(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,
Λ = λ, Un = u)
)
≤ 1 +Ev2,λ,u exp
(
nρ(RI −Rp)+
φ(ρ, PY n
2
|V n
1
,V n
2
=v2,Λ=λ,Un=u, PV n1 |V n2 =v2,Λ=λ,Un=u)
)
≤ 1 +Ev2,u exp
(
nρ(RI −Rp)+
φ(ρ, PY n
2
|V n
1
,V n
2
=v2,Un=u,∑
λ
PΛ|V n
2
=v2,Un=uPV n1 |V n2 =v2,Λ=λ,Un=u)
)
(by the concavity of exp(φ) function)
≤ 1 +Ev2,u exp
(
nρ(RI −Rp)+
φ(ρ, PY n
2
|V n
1
,V n
2
=v2,Un=u, PV n1 |V n2 =v2,Un=u)
)
(39)
Let us first focus on the nonconstant term of (39):
Ev2,u exp
(
nρ(RI −Rp)+
φ(ρ, PY n
2
|V n
1
,V n
2
=v2,Un=u, PV n1 |V n2 =v2,Un=u)
)
=
n∏
i=1
∑
ui∈U ,v2,i∈V2
PU,V2(ui, v2,i) exp
(
ρ(RI −Rp)+
φ(ρ, PY2|V1,V2=v2,i,U=ui , PV1|V2=v2,i,U=ui)
)
=
[ ∑
ui∈U ,v2,i∈V2
PU,V2(ui, v2,i) exp
(
ρ(RI −Rp)+
φ(ρ, PY2|V1,V2=v2,i,U=ui , PV1|V2=v2,i,U=ui)
)]n
(40)
Substitute the expression (40) back into (39), then take log
on both sides of the inequality (39), and use the inequality
log(x+ 1) ≤ x, ∀x ≥ 0, then we can obtain
I(α1,I(F
n
1 (C
n
1 ));Y
n
2 |F
n
1 ,Λ, U
n)
≤
1
ρ
[ ∑
ui∈U ,v2,i∈V2
PU,V2(ui, v2,i) exp
(
ρ(RI −Rp)+
φ(ρ, PY2|V1,V2=v2,i,U=ui , PV1|V2=v2,i,U=ui)
)]n
(41)
Since what we concern is under what situation the above
upper bound goes to zero as n → ∞, take the logarithm of
(41) we have
− log ρ+ nρ
[
RI − Rp +A(ρ)
]
.
In the above equation,
A(ρ) =
1
ρ
log
( ∑
ui,v2,iV2
PU,V2(ui, v2,i)
exp
(
φ(ρ, PY2|V1,V2=v2,i,U=ui , PV1|V2=v2,i,U=ui)
))
.
(42)
We can see that A(ρ) → I(V1;Y2|U, V2) as ρ → 0 by the
l’Hôpital’s rule.
Set the size of Cn1 as
log |Cn1 |
n
= Rp = R1 − δ
with δ > 0 such that
RI −R1,I,e > RI −Rp + I(V1;Y2|UV2) (43)
for all ∅ 6= I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. Note that here (R1, R2) ∈ RHK .
Then by Eq. (41), we can see that there exists ǫn → 0(n→
∞) such that
I(C1,I ;Y
n
2 |F
n
1 ,Λ, U
n) ≤ ǫn (44)
if RI = R1,I,e. On the other hand, when RI > R1,I,e, by
Eqs. (39) and (40), we have
Efn
1
,λ,u exp
(
ρI(C1,I ;Y
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,Λ = λ, U
n = u)
)
≤ 1 + exp
(
nρ(RI −Rp + I(V1;Y2|UV2) + ǫ(ρ))
)
, (45)
where ǫ(ρ) → 0(ρ → 0). Let δn be the decoding error
probability of the underling channel code for the interference
channel. Then, by the almost same argument as [9], there exists
at least one tuple (fn1 , λ, u) such that
I(C1,I ;Y
n
2 |F
n
1 ,Λ, U
n) < 2× 2× 2T ǫn (if RI = R1,I,e),
exp(ρI(C1,I ;Y
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,Λ = λ, U
n = u))
≤2× 2× 2T
[
1 + exp
(
nρ(RI −Rp + I(V1;Y2|UV2) + ǫ(ρ))
)]
,
(46)
Decoding error probability ≤ 2× 2× 2T δn.
In the above expressions, ǫ(ρ) is a constant depends only
on ρ, and limρ→0 ǫ(ρ) = 0.
By Eq. (46) we can see
I(C1,I ;Y
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,Λ = λ, U
n = u))
n
≤
1 + log(2× 2× 2T )
nρ
+RI −Rp + I(V1;Y2|UV2) + ǫ(ρ).
(47)
for RI −Rp+ I(V ;Z|U)+ ǫ(ρ) ≥ 0, where we used log(1+
exp(x)) ≤ 1 + x for x ≥ 0. By Eq. (43) and (47) we can see
that the equivocation rate H(C1,I |Y n2 , Fn1 = fn1 ,Λ = λ)/n
becomes larger than the required value R1,I,e for sufficiently
large n. This completes the analysis of the equivocation rates
and the mutual information for all ∅ 6= I ⊆ {1, . . . , T1}.
Remark 11: In (47), we have “almost” provided a bound for
the mutual information even when the length of the codeword
is finite. We say “almost” because the error term ǫ(ρ) is not
explicitly determined. But we can always choose a small ρ,
thus make the error term as small as we want. In this way
we bound the equivocation rate in the worst case with finite
codeword length.
B. Outer Bound
Next we will provide an outer bound for secure multiplex
coding over interference channels:
Theorem 12: An outer bound for the interference channels
with secure multiplex coding is as the following:
R1,I1,e ≤ min
{
I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U)
I(V1;Y1|V2, U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U)
}
R2,I2,e ≤ min
{
I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|U)
I(V2;Y2|V1, U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U)
}
0 ≤ R1,I1,e ≤
∑
i∈I1
R1,i
0 ≤ R2,I2,e ≤
∑
i∈I2
R2,i
0 ≤ R1 =
∑
1≤i≤T1
R1,i ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)
0 ≤ R2 =
∑
1≤j≤T2
R2,j ≤ I(V2;Y2|U)
In the above expressions, ∅ 6= I1 ⊆ {1, . . . , T1}, ∅ 6= I2 ⊆
{1, . . . , T2} are subsets of the index sets for transmitter 1 and
2 respectively.
Note that the variables in the above expressions satisfy the
Markov chain U → V1V2 → X1X2 → Y1Y2.
Proof: The outer bound is constructed by using the tech-
niques in [2] section IV, by combining two bounds obtained
from different set of inequalities.
Obviously it can be seen,
Rt ≤ I(Vt;Yt|U)
Since after receiver t receives Y nt , it will be able to decode
the confidential message Cnt with high probability (reliable
transmission requirement), we can express this as:
H(C1|Y1) ≤ nδ1 (48a)
H(C2|Y2) ≤ nδ2 (48b)
With out loss of generality, we only consider for the case
of R1,I1,e.
1) Construct the 1st bound:
R1,I1,e ≤ H(C1|Y2) ≤ H(C1|Y2)−H(C1|Y1) + nδ1 (49)
Then by almost the same arguments as in [2] section IV
part A (just change W to C), we have
R1,I1,e ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U) (50)
2) Construct the 2nd bound:
R1,I1,e ≤ H(C1|Y2) ≤ H(C1, C2|Y2)
= H(C1|Y2, C2) +H(C2|Y2)
≤ H(C1|Y2, C2) + nδ2 −H(C1|Y1) + nδ1
≤ H(C1|Y2, C2)−H(C1|Y1, C2) + n(δ1 + δ2)
(51)
By the same argument in [2] section IV part B, we have
R1,I1,e ≤ I(V1;Y1|V2, U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U) (52)
Remark 13: If we look carefully into the outer and inner
bounds, we can see that when R2 = R2,e = 0, which means
the model degenerates to the wiretap channel, the inner and
outer bound coincides and become the capacity-equivocation
region of the wiretap channel.
IV. GAUSSIAN INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
In this section we consider Gaussian interference channel
with confidential messages. As in [14], the channel input and
output are real numbers, and the channel in Fig. 1 is specified
as:
Y1 = X1 + τ1X2 +N1 (61a)
Y2 = τ2X1 +X2 +N2 (61b)
τ1 and τ2 are normalized crossover channel gains, Xt has the
average power constraint:
n∑
i=1
E[X2t,i]
n
≤ Pt.
and N1 and N2 are two independent, zero-mean, unit variance,
Gaussian noise variables.
We can easily carry over our proof in the last section to the
case of Gaussian channel, because
• By replacing the probability mass functions PZ|L and
PZ by their probability density functions, Eq. (8) can be
extended to the Gaussian case.
• The random codebook Λ obeys multidimensional Gaus-
sian distribution.
• The concavity of exp(φ) is preserved even after its second
argument is changed to be conditional probability density.
• All the derivations in the last section hold true even
when Vt, Yt, Λ are continuous and their probability mass
functions are replaced with probability density functions,
while U , Bnt , Fnt remain to be discrete random variables
over finite alphabets.
To get the expression for the inner bound on the capacity
region for secure multiplex coding, we only need to calculate
for I(V1;Y1|W1W2), I(W2V1;Y1|W1), I(V1;Y1|W2),
I(W2V1;Y1), I(V1;Y2|V2), I(V1;Y1), I(V1;Y2) and
I(V1;Y2|V2) because of the symmetry of the coefficients.
(For other expressions, we only need to switch 1 and 2.)
The scheme in our consideration is similar to [2] except that
we allow both transmitters to generate artificial noise:
I(V1;Y1|W1W2) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
β1θ1(1− µ1)P1
1 + β1(1 − θ1)P1 + τ21β2(1 − θ2µ2)P2
]
(53)
I(W2V1;Y1|W1) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
β1θ1(1− µ1)P1 + τ21β2θ2µ2P2
1 + β1(1 − θ1)P1 + τ21β2(1 − θ2µ2)P2
]
(54)
I(V1;Y1|W2) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
β1θ1P1
1 + β1(1 − θ1)P1 + τ21β2(1 − θ2µ2)P2
]
(55)
I(W2V1;Y1) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
β1θ1P1 + τ
2
1β2θ2µ2P2
1 + β1(1 − θ1)P1 + τ21β2(1 − θ2µ2)P2
]
(56)
I(V1;Y2|V2) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
τ22β1θ1P1
1 + τ22β1(1 − θ1)P1 + β2(1 − θ2)P2
]
(57)
I(V1;Y1) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
β1θ1P1
1 + β1(1 − θ1)P1 + τ21β2P2
]
(58)
I(V1;Y2) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
τ22β1θ1P1
1 + τ22β1(1 − θ1)P1 + β2P2
]
(59)
I(V1;Y1|V2) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
β1θ1P1
1 + β1(1 − θ1)P1 + τ21β2(1 − θ2)P2
]
(60)
Assume transmitter t only use a fraction of βt of its
maximum power (0 ≤ βt ≤ 1). Among the transmission
power, transmitter t then takes out a fraction of (1 − θt)
(0 ≤ θt ≤ 1) to make artificial noise to achieve the secrecy
requirement. Among the power devoted for transmitting con-
fidential message, a fraction of µt is used over the “common
channel”. Let U serve as a convex combination operator, thus
we have (for t = 1, 2)
Xt = Vt +At, Vt = Wt +Qt
where Wt, Qt, At are independent Gaussian random variables
with Wt ∼ N [0, βtµtθtPt], Qt ∼ N [0, βt(1 − µt)θtPt] and
At ∼ N [0, βt(1− θt)Pt].
It is straightforward to evaluate the mutual information
mentioned, and we have (53) ∼ (57).
Take all the above equations into theorem 9 and 12, we have
obtained the expressions of inner and outer bounds over the
Gaussian interference channel.
V. DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON
Compare with the results in [2] where also the inner and
outer bounds are given, one of the most obvious advantage
of our results is that by secure multiplex coding, the rate
loss incurred by adding dummy message to achieve security
is removed, thus the maximum total transmission rate is
increased.
Now we compare our results with that in [2] when T1 =
T2 = 1, which means that a “trivial” multiplex coding with
only one channel is used. This scheme is equivalent to adding
dummy message to achieve secrecy as in [2].
For convenience of comparison, we denote the rate of
confidential messages transmitted by transmitter t is Rt, while
the rate of the dummy message is denoted by R′t. And the
confidential messages is conveyed by random variable C1 and
C2 for the two transmitters respectively.
We can see the outer bound becomes the same as in [2], so
in the following we focus on the inner bound.
If we let Bt = Ct and Et = ∅ this means we remove the
variables W1 and W2 from (15) to (23), then we can see that
the capacity region in theorem 9 becomes
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U, V2)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|U, V1)
(62)
which is exactly the inner bound proposed in [2]. In this way
we can easily see that at least our proposed inner bound is
always not worse than that proposed in [2].
Moreover by (47), we can bound the amount of leakage of
confidential message for the unintended receiver (without loss
of generality we consider for C1):
I(C1;Y
n
2 |F
n
1 = f
n
1 ,Λ = λ, U
n = u))
n
≤
1 + log(2× 2× 2T )
nρ
−R
′
1 + I(V1;Y2|UV2) + ǫ(ρ).
(63)
Note (63) is valid even when the rate of the secret trans-
mission is higher than the described secret capacity.
In the following, we will compare the inner bound proposed
in theorem 9 and (62) in [2], and by show some numerical
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Fig. 3. Achievable regions with τ1 = τ2 = 0.2 and P1 = P2 = 10.
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Fig. 4. Achievable regions with τ1 = 0.1, τ2 = 0.3 and P1 = 80, P2 = 10.
results in several Gaussian interference channels (different τ1
and τ2) with different power constraints (P1 and P2).
The “Secure Region in [2]” indicates (62), while the “Secure
Han-Kobayashi Region” is presented in theorem 9. In the cases
where P1 = P2 and τ1 = τ2, we are not able to find any
visible difference between the two bounds, as shown in Fig.
3. But when the power constraints are different for the two
transmitters (i.e. P1 6= P2) and the channel is not symmetric
(i.e. τ1 6= τ2), we find some cases where our proposed inner
bound is strictly larger as shown in Fig. 4.
Here we also plot the best achievable secure region of
the two schemes, by this we mean that we add “non-trivial”
multiplex coding to remove the rate loss caused by the dummy
messages. In [2], the region is expressed as
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2|U)
(64)
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Fig. 5. Achievable regions with τ1 = τ2 = 0.5 and P1 = P2 = 10.
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Fig. 6. Achievable regions with τ1 = τ2 = 0.5 and P1 = P2 = 100.
while our proposed scheme can achieve the whole Han-
Kobayashi region. So we also compare (64) with the Han-
Kobayashi region in Fig. 5 and 6. These plots displayed
oblivious improvement which comes from the coding scheme
that we applied.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper inner and outer bounds for secure multiplex
coding over interference channel has been proposed, we have
also presented a random coding scheme that achieves the
inner bound. We improved the inner bound in [2] and pushed
the inner bound to the Han-Kobayashi region. Also we have
substituted the weak secrecy requirement by the strong one,
and removed the information rate loss caused by the dummy
message. Moreover we evaluated the equivocation rate for a
collection of secret messages. Finally we extended our results
to the case of Gaussian channel.
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